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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Larry E. Ribstein* 
Corporations’ right to participate in political debate is one of the 
most contentious current constitutional and political issues. The 
debate has intensified in recent years as government seeks to rein in 
corporations’ increasing global reach and corporations react by 
stepping up their participation in politics. The debate came to a head 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission1 that the First Amendment restricts laws aimed 
at corporate political campaign activities.  
The case concerned a documentary criticizing then presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton by Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation 
financed in part by general treasury funds of for-profit corporations. 
Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA)2 prohibits corporations and unions from using their general 
funds to finance certain publicly distributed communications 
referring to identified candidates for federal office. The Court 
overruled prior law upholding these limits and invalidated BCRA’s 
restrictions on corporate and union expenditures. The majority 
reasoned that the provision was a ban on speech that could be upheld 
under the First Amendment only if it “furthers a compelling interest 
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”3 The provision at 
issue failed to pass this test.  
The majority bluntly opined that the First Amendment makes no 
exception for corporations, noting that it “protects speech and 
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each,”4 and “does not permit 
                                                                                                                 
 * Mildred van Voorhis Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks for helpful 
comments by participants in the Georgia State University College of Law Symposium on Citizens 
United, Kurt Lash and Stefan Padfield.  
 1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 2. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). 
 3. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 
551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007). 
 4. Id. at 899. 
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Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the 
corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political 
speech.”5 Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas added that the text of the 
First Amendment  
offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from 
single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to 
unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated 
associations of individuals-and the dissent offers no evidence 
about the original meaning of the text to support any such 
exclusion. We are therefore simply left with the question whether 
the speech at issue in this case is “speech” covered by the First 
Amendment. No one says otherwise . . . . Indeed, to exclude or 
impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the 
modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn 
the addition of this speech to the public debate.6 
Perhaps most importantly, the Citizens United majority rejected 
corporate speech’s potential distorting effect on political debate as a 
rationale for regulation.7 The Court reasoned that regulation under 
the anti-distortion rationale would potentially muffle a large segment 
of the population, concluding that  
[w]hen Government seeks to use its full power, including the 
criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her 
information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it 
uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First 
Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.8  
                                                                                                                 
 5. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 6. Id. at 929. 
 7. For a critique of the anti-distortion argument and of other justifications for restricting corporate 
political speech under the First Amendment, see Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 
WASH & LEE L. REV. 109 (1992).  
 8. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. 
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Citizens United, in short, was more concerned with the potential 
excesses of government power than with those of private 
corporations.  
Citizens United did not, however, end the debate over corporate 
speech anymore than did Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,9 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commmission,10 
which Citizens United overruled. Many believe the Supreme Court 
unleashed a corporate monster that will drown out the rest of the 
populace. For example, one commentator opined on the eve of the 
2010 election that “[u]nder this system [unleashed by CU], the game 
is over. Our democracy is dead.”11 The author concluded that 
corporations could use their spare cash to buy elections and noted 
that money is flooding into “right-wing groups.”12 The public 
reaction to the Citizens United case suggests that the controversy over 
corporate speech was not quelled by the Court’s narrowly divided 
vote.  
The Court’s holding arguably left an opportunity for its opponents 
to erode its protection of corporate speech despite the majority 
opinion’s absolute language. The opinion upheld the disclosure and 
disclaimer provisions of the law in question13 and suggested that 
regulation of corporate governance might pass constitutional 
muster.14 Congress quickly sought to exploit these loopholes with the 
DISCLOSE Act,15 which passed the House in June 2010, and the 
Shareholder Protection Act,16 which passed the House Financial 
Services Committee the following month. Passage of such laws could 
set up yet another Supreme Court decision on this divisive issue.  
This article shows that Citizens United shifted the debate over 
corporate speech from corporations’ power to distort political debate 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 10. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 11. Brett Arends, Death of a Democracy, MARKET WATCH, Oct. 19, 2010, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/death-of-a-democracy-2010-10-19?pagenumber=1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–16.  
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
 15. H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010). 
 16. H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010). 
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to the corporate governance processes that authorize this speech. The 
corporate governance move is a facially plausible strategy. It seems 
to be a content-neutral pursuit of objectives other than restricting 
speech and, therefore, to escape strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment. This move also recognizes that corporations, as 
artificial entities, cannot speak in the same sense as humans do, and 
that the First Amendment is more properly concerned with the 
expressive rights of the individuals who speak through corporations 
than with the rights of artificial entities. Jurisprudentially, looking 
through the corporation to its owners and agents arguably reconciles 
the majority’s concern for liberty with the dissent’s concern with 
equality and the corporation’s potential to distort public debate.17   
Despite the corporate governance strategy’s apparent advantages, it 
provides a weak basis for regulating corporate speech under the First 
Amendment. Regulation of the corporate processes that produce 
corporate speech is still speech regulation even if it sails under the 
corporate governance flag. Whether the regulation survives First 
Amendment scrutiny under Citizens United thus depends on whether 
corporate governance regulation reasonably effectuates expression of 
shareholder beliefs. Testing the corporate governance theory in light 
of the realities of corporate finance and governance, this paper finds 
that the dispersed, passive, and anonymous shareholders that 
corporate-governance-based regulation purports to protect are 
unlikely to have much expressive interest at stake in corporate 
activities. Moreover, regulation protecting this interest is likely to 
have little value and to pit various stakeholders against each other. 
Thus, any expressive interest shareholders have is more likely to be 
thwarted than promoted by corporate governance regulation. This 
paper also discusses the uncertain implications of the corporate 
governance theory for regulation of corporate governance, non-
election-related commercial speech, and speech outside the context of 
publicly traded corporations. 
It is important to clarify the limits of my analysis. I do not claim 
that the corporate governance basis for regulating corporate speech 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010).  
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can never survive First Amendment scrutiny. I seek only to analyze 
the specific question of whether regulation of corporate governance 
can be sustained on the ground that it vindicates shareholders’ 
expressive rights. This claim has significant problems because of the 
inherent limits on the efficacy of government regulation in this area, 
such regulation’s potential for actually harming expressive rights, and 
the uncertain implications of this rationale for contexts beyond that 
involved in Citizens United. Claims that shareholders’ expressive 
rights can sustain regulation of corporate governance under the First 
Amendment must deal with these problems or risk being trumped by 
the majority’s concerns with listeners’ rights and government 
censorship. If they do not, it is likely that this argument would be 
trumped by the listeners’ rights to receive the information 
emphasized in the majority opinion.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the support in 
Citizens United for regulation of corporate speech under a corporate 
governance theory. Part II places this rationale under the lens of 
corporate finance theory and discerns serious flaws with the theory as 
a justification for regulating corporate speech under the First 
Amendment. Part III explores some implications of the corporate 
governance theory for types of firms and speech other than those 
dealt with directly in Citizens United. The complications revealed by 
this analysis provide an additional reason to be skeptical of this 
rationale for regulating business association speech under the First 
Amendment.  
I.  THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RATIONALE FOR REGULATING 
CORPORATE SPEECH 
An understanding of the corporate governance argument for 
corporate speech regulation begins with distinguishing it from the 
main rationale for regulating corporate speech under prior cases and 
the dissenting opinion in Citizens United. More specifically, this 
analysis involves distinguishing “external” distortion, or the effect of 
corporate speech on public debate, from “internal” distortion, or 
whether corporate speech represents the views of the firm’s owners.  
5
Ribstein: The First Amendment and Corporate Governance
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:4 
 
1024 
The dissenters expressed concern with external distortion resulting 
from corporations’ corporate advantages in funding political speech. 
They noted that corporations have special features, including limited 
liability, perpetual life, and separation of ownership and control, 
which enable them to “amass and deploy financial resources on a 
scale few natural persons can match.”18 Corporations, they said  
are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not 
simply because they have a lot of money but because of their 
legal and organizational structure. Remove all restrictions on 
their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a type of rent 
seeking that is ‘far more destructive’ than what noncorporations 
are capable of. 19 
The dissenters also observed that the marketplace directs resources 
to corporations for economic reasons and not because of their ideas.20 
Corporations’ economic power could cause elections to misrepresent 
the views of the electorate as a whole. Nor was it even clear who was 
“speaking when a business corporation places an advertisement that 
endorses or attacks a particular candidate.”21 The dissenters thought 
the customers, employees, and shareholders are too remote from the 
decision to count, and that the executives who presumably decide to 
place the ad are barred by their fiduciary duties from doing so to 
express their personal views.22 Since corporations do not have 
personal views on who should win elections, their participation in 
elections “is more transactional than ideological.”23  
As noted above,24 the majority rejected external distortion as a 
basis for regulating corporate speech. The Court concluded that any 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Citizens United,  130 S. Ct. at 974. 
 19. Id. at 975 (citing Robert Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2002)). 
 20. Id. at 974. 
 21. Id. at 972. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 973 (quoting Supp. Brief for Committee for Economic Development as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellee at 10, Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-
205). 
 24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
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concern for distortion was trumped by the dangers posed by the 
remedy—government “censorship to control thought.”25 The vigor of 
the majority’s rejection of the distortion argument apparently leaves 
little basis for a prediction that the Court will change course again 
and return to an equality-based rationale for regulating corporate 
speech under the First Amendment. 
The sharp division between the majority and dissent regarding 
external distortion suggests a need to look elsewhere for a principle 
that could unify the Court in future corporate speech cases. This 
might be found in the dissent’s view that “shareholders who disagree 
with the corporation’s electoral message may find their financial 
investments being used to undermine their political convictions.”26 
This theory has the attraction of defending corporate shareholders’ 
freedom of speech rather than the equality interest the Court rejected 
as a basis for corporate speech restrictions. The dissenters thought 
shareholder rights were currently “‘so limited as to be almost 
nonexistent,’ given the internal authority wielded by boards and 
managers and the expansive protections afforded by the business 
judgment rule.”27 Moreover, they reasoned that shareholders’ ability 
to sell when they learn about objectionable speech is not sufficient 
protection because of tax and other constraints on sales and because 
these sales occur after the corporation has engaged in objectionable 
speech.28   
The dissent, therefore, would support beefing up the processes for 
authorizing corporate speech. At the same time, the majority left open 
the possibility that some regulation aimed at protecting shareholders 
might pass First Amendment scrutiny. The majority held this 
rationale could not support BCRA’s ban of corporate speech, which 
extended to the political speech of media corporations and to 
nonprofit firms and sole proprietorships whose shareholders needed 
no protection, while leaving shareholders unprotected from the broad 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. 
 26. Id. at 977. 
 27. Id. at 978 (quoting Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 320 (1999)). 
 28. Id. 
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swaths of speech BRCA does not cover.29 The majority reasoned that 
abuse of shareholders might be protected “through the procedures of 
corporate democracy”30 and that the way to protect shareholders “is 
not to restrict speech but to consider and explore other regulatory 
mechanisms.”31  
The remainder of this article focuses on the corporate governance 
rationale for regulating corporate speech and its potential 
implications.  
II.  IDENTIFYING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RATIONALE 
This Part considers whether and to what extent shareholder 
protection might support regulation of corporate processes for 
determining corporate speech. Subpart A discusses the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny this speech calls for, which turns on whether 
corporate governance regulation can be characterized as content-
neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of communications. 
Subpart B discusses whether the corporate governance regulation can 
be said to promote expression by freeing shareholders from endorsing 
views they do not support. Subpart C discusses specific applications 
of the corporate governance rationale, particularly including the 
proposed Shareholder Protection Act and alternative academic 
proposals for shareholder protection legislation.  
A.  Applying the First Amendment 
One basis of the corporate governance argument for corporate 
speech regulation is that it avoids strict First Amendment scrutiny by 
regulating only the time, place, and manner of speech rather than its 
content. For example, a regulation requiring draft registrants to carry 
their draft cards could be applied to forbid draft card burning because 
it reasonably furthered a government interest unrelated to suppressing 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 911.  
 30. Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). 
 31. Id. 
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free expression.32 Although content-neutral regulation may 
significantly affect speech,33 it runs less risk of government 
censorship than legislation that discriminates against particular 
viewpoints.  
General corporate governance regulation that constrains speech as 
well as other corporate activities probably falls within the content-
neutral category. For example, requiring a shareholder vote on all 
decisions outside the corporation’s usual course of business probably 
would not contravene the First Amendment even if it applies to 
political activities.  
On the other hand, regulation specifically restricting speech by for-
profit corporations may be considered viewpoint-discriminatory and 
subject to a higher level of First Amendment scrutiny. Given 
corporations’ inherent nature as mechanisms for earning profits from 
employing capital in pursuit of business opportunities, regulating 
speech by these entities can be viewed as directed at a specific type 
of activity.34 The same conclusion might hold even though the 
regulation deals only with the procedures for authorizing corporate 
speech rather than prohibiting the speech itself, because the 
regulation effectively restricts the speech by making it more costly. 
To be sure, the ultimate constitutional determination would depend 
on the specific nature of the regulation and, perhaps, the activity to 
which it is applied. The point here is that corporate governance 
regulation may be subject to a high level of First Amendment 
scrutiny. This underscores the need to analyze the government’s 
rationale for regulating corporate speech in order to protect 
shareholders’ expressive rights. 
                                                                                                                 
 32. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).  
 33. Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 
(1981–82). 
 34. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 119–20. 
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B.  Protecting Shareholders’ Right of Expression  
Assuming strict First Amendment scrutiny applies to regulation of 
corporate decisions to engage in speech, the question is whether this 
regulation can survive this scrutiny. The Citizens United dissent 
makes the key move of asserting that regulating corporate speech 
protects rather than interferes with free expression. According to the 
dissent, “[s]hareholders who disagree with the corporation’s electoral 
message may find their financial investments being used to 
undermine their political convictions.”35 Regulation of corporate 
governance accordingly might be acceptable under cases protecting 
the freedom of association from legal interference and union 
members from being forced to associate with views they disagree 
with.36 Although the freedom-of-expression argument could not save 
the ban on speech involved in Citizens United, the majority suggested 
that “other regulatory mechanisms” might pass First Amendment 
muster. The following subsections consider whether corporate 
governance regulation of corporate speech might be justified under 
this rationale. As we will see, the application of these principles 
depends on whether corporate speech interferes with shareholder 
expression and, if so, whether regulation might do more harm than 
good for shareholders’ expressive rights. 
1.  Does Corporate Speech Involve Expression by Shareholders? 
Corporate governance protection for shareholder expressive rights 
rests on the assumption that shareholders express themselves through 
the corporations in which they invest. It follows from this assumption 
that if shareholders object to managers’ use of corporate resources for 
some corporate speech, this use infringes shareholders’ expression.  
                                                                                                                 
 35. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977. 
 36. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010). These authors cite, as to the freedom of association, Boy Scouts of Am. 
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) and Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of 
the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010). With respect to the speech rights of union members, 
they cite Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) and Victor Brudney, Business 
Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 269–70 (1981) 
(applying this principle to the corporate law context).  
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Professors Bebchuk and Jackson, arguing for the need to protect 
the freedom of expression of shareholders in publicly held 
corporations, emphasize the potential divergence between the speech 
preferences of the shareholders and those of corporate executives 
who control the speech attributed to the corporation. Even if they are 
correct about this potential divergence, it does not follow that this 
frustrates anybody’s freedom of expression unless shareholders 
associate themselves with their corporations’ speech. The authors’ 
sole evidence that they do is that “[t]he SEC has long recognized that 
shareholders may have an interest in social policy issues that goes 
beyond the issues’ direct financial relevance.”37 The fact that 
government has regulated based on a given assumption is not 
convincing evidence of the correctness of that assumption. 
In fact, it is more reasonable to hypothesize based on the nature of 
the shareholders’ investments that most do not identify with the 
speech of corporations they invest in. Individual shareholders 
generally invest in publicly held corporations through diversified 
portfolios and through other institutions such as mutual or pension 
funds. These shareholders may have little idea which stocks they are 
holding and are concerned only with the total risk and return of their 
portfolio. The Citizens United dissenters recognized this when noting 
that it was unclear that anybody, including the shareholders, was 
speaking for or through corporations.38 It follows from this analysis 
that corporate speech is often the expression of the firm’s executives 
or directors who actually decide what the corporation says. 
An alternative characterization of corporate speech is that the 
managers are expressing the shareholders’ views, at least to the 
extent that the speech furthers firms’ profit-maximizing objective. 
Indeed, an argument against corporate speech rights recognizes that 
corporate managers cater to the pro-profit-maximizing shareholders 
and ignore their own and other shareholders’ preferences for more 
socially oriented speech.39 The argument denigrates this expression 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, at 96.  
 38. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972. 
 39. See Kent Greenfield et al., Should Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, 30 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 875, 880 (2007) (“Apolitical, amoral, investors create massive pressure on every company to act 
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on the ground that it is dictated by corporate law and policy. But this 
position ignores the broad leeway that the business judgment rule 
gives managers in deciding what to say or do on behalf of the 
corporation. Moreover, the First Amendment is concerned with the 
fact of expression, not with why the speakers choose to express 
themselves in a particular way. 
To be sure, some shareholders may not want to be associated with 
some of the speech financed by their investments. As discussed 
below in this subpart, this possibility raises the question whether 
regulation of corporate governance is necessary to protect the 
expressive rights of these shareholders and whether any such 
protection would violate the First Amendment because it interferes 
with the expression of other investors. Speech that expresses the 
managers’ personal views could be actionable self-dealing, but that is 
not a self-expression-based First Amendment justification for 
banning the speech. If a thief steals money and uses it for speech, the 
thief may be prosecuted but the theft is not a reason for banning the 
thief’s speech. The only difference from the dissenting corporate 
shareholder situation is that the thief speaks for himself rather than 
purporting to speak for the victim. But this returns to the question just 
discussed of whether shareholders’ self-expression is at stake in this 
situation.  
2.  Is the Corporation Entitled to Protection? 
Bebchuk and Jackson assert in support of the constitutionality of 
corporate governance regulation of corporate speech that this 
regulation is justified in order to protect the freedom of expression of 
the corporation, which they see as “the bearer of the right” to speak.40 
Their premise is that corporate governance rules simply “determine 
whether the corporation wishes to speak,” which, in turn, depends on 
                                                                                                                 
in the way that those investors believe will maximize stock price.”). This argument rests on the view that 
well-run corporations are like amoral sociopaths because they mono-maniacally seek to maximize 
profits rather than, like human beings, taking into account the overall human interest in social welfare. 
See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER (2004). 
 40. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, at 108. 
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whether the “speech is disfavored by the company’s shareholders.”41 
This move may justify giving corporate speech less protection than 
non-corporate speech making the right-holder an artificial entity 
rather than a natural person. 
The Court, however, avoided the artificial entity problem by 
holding that the First Amendment “protects speech and speaker, and 
the ideas that flow from each”42 without regard to the speaker’s 
corporate identity. The Court noted that “[b]y suppressing the speech 
of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the 
Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the 
public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to 
their interests.”43 In other words, the First Amendment does not 
guard corporations’ expressive rights, but rather the public’s interest 
in hearing what corporations have to say.  
A strong form of this listeners’ rights argument would invalidate 
all corporate governance regulation that restricts listeners’ rights to 
hear what corporations would say in the absence of this regulation. 
The Court’s endorsement of some corporate governance regulation 
appears inconsistent with this strong-form position. It follows that 
reasonable corporate governance regulation that does not unduly 
restrict corporate speech may pass muster. The question is whether 
this includes regulation that protects the shareholders’ expressive 
rights, as discussed above and below in this Part.  
Finally, even if the speech theoretically is that of the corporation, it 
is not clear how to distinguish speech of an artificial entity from that 
of the real people who speak through the entity.  We are then back to 
the question of whether and how to protect shareholder expression.  
3.  Is Regulation Justified to Protect Shareholder Expression? 
As discussed in subsection 1, most public corporation shareholders 
either have little or no expressive interest in the speech of 
corporations in which they have invested or actually agree with the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id.  
 42. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. 
 43. Id. at 907. 
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corporations’ profit-maximizing speech. The question then becomes 
whether the First Amendment allows corporate governance 
regulation that protects the interests of the remaining shareholders 
who have an expressive interest in, and disagree with, their 
corporations’ speech.  
The Citizens United dissenters provide little support for such 
regulation in the corporate context. They rely instead on quotes from 
articles that do not support their position. For example, the Sitkoff 
article the dissenters quote from44 actually concludes that “[t]here is 
nothing special about managerial control over corporate political 
speech that warrants abandoning ordinary modes of corporate 
governance in favor of a mandatory rule and criminalization,” and 
ultimately explains corporate speech restrictions in terms of 
corporate demands for restrictions on political rent extraction by 
legislators.45 The dissenters also rely on Blair and Stout46 who 
actually advocate managerial power to allocate corporate resources 
among various corporate constituencies. This view would support 
managers’ speaking for the corporate “team” rather than for 
shareholders as the dissent advocates. 
As noted at the beginning of this subpart, Bebchuk and Jackson 
find support for regulating corporate governance on self-expression 
grounds in cases dealing with union members.47 The authors concede 
that these cases can be distinguished on the ground that workers may 
be required to join unions and therefore to associate with their 
political positions.48 Even where this is not the case, a worker’s 
association with his union almost certainly is closer than that between 
a corporation and its diversified investors. Bebchuk and Jackson find 
the union analogy in problems with corporate governance, and 
specifically in the assertion that “the volitional nature of being a 
shareholder in a public company does not protect shareholders from 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 975. 
 45. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 1165. 
 46. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 47. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 48. Id. 
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the consequences of political speech they disfavor.”49 This raises the 
question whether regulation of corporate governance intended to fix 
this “volitional” problem can survive First Amendment scrutiny. As 
the Citizens United majority made clear in emphasizing the 
overbreadth of the regulation at issue in that case,50 the 
reasonableness of the regulation in accomplishing its stated purpose 
is an important factor in assessing its constitutionality under the First 
Amendment. 
Regulation of corporate decisions to engage in speech collides with 
the fact that markets operate fairly well to constrain managers’ use of 
shareholders’ money, including on corporate speech. Managers’ 
potential misuse of corporate funds contrary to shareholders’ wishes 
is part of the broader category of “agency costs”—the costs of 
delegating power, including over corporate speech, to a non-owner 
agent. These include not only the costs of agent cheating but also the 
costs of monitoring by principals and bonding by agents to minimize 
this cheating.51 There are many potential mechanisms for controlling 
these costs, including independent directors, shareholder voting 
mechanisms, transferable shares, fiduciary duties and remedies, 
disclosure rules, and gatekeeper responsibilities.52 Agency costs are 
never zero: as cheating declines, the costs of controlling it rise. These 
costs, including controlling an agent’s use of his power to engage in 
speech to which the principal objects, can be avoided only by not 
having agents, which is an unacceptable price to pay in many 
situations. Firms’ value depends in part on their selection of the mix 
of agency cost control devices that minimizes the total of managerial 
cheating and agency cost control. Firms can choose from a 
“horizontal” menu of various state and national laws and a “vertical” 
menu of organizational forms available in each jurisdiction, including 
various types of corporations, partnerships, and hybrid firms offering 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, at 114. 
 50. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 51. See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 52. For a review and analysis of these choices, see REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL 
DAVIES, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
(2d ed. 2009). 
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a mixture of partnership and corporate features.53 These contract 
choices are priced in securities markets. This helps ensure both that 
investors get the quality of agency cost control they are paying for, 
and that firms have incentives to provide for appropriate levels of 
investor protection. 
These various agency cost controls apply to corporate speech. 
Moreover, as with agency costs generally, markets discipline firms’ 
speech. Corporations compete for capital in highly competitive 
capital markets. Firms that waste money on speech that does not help 
their bottom line will have to pay more for capital. The efficiency of 
corporate speech expenditures depends on how the speech affects all 
aspects of a firm’s business. Thus, managers can serve shareholders 
only by also catering to customers’ interests.54 For example, when 
Target donated $150,000 for use by a Minnesota gubernatorial 
candidate who happened to be an outspoken opponent of gay 
marriage the firm was subject to highly visible protests by gay-rights 
advocates that caused the managers to review the firm’s decision.55 
Target’s experience illustrates firms’ reputational risks from political 
contributions. 
Even if markets imperfectly discipline agency costs in general, the 
particular type of agency costs inherent in corporate speech that 
interferes with shareholders’ expression is likely to be more 
susceptible to market discipline than agent conduct generally. 
Although corporate agents might misbehave when they stand to earn 
monetary benefits at the firm’s expense, markets and corporate 
governance generally can deal with lesser temptations such as 
inadequate care or mildly self-interested conduct. Shareholders might 
have to worry about lucrative compensation packages or costly 
empire-building acquisitions, but executives would be unlikely to risk 
board dismissal for potentially embarrassing or costly political speech 
whose potential benefits are long-range and speculative. Market 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010).  
 54. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 N.D. L. REV. 
1431, 1452–56 (2006). 
 55. See Ira Boudway, Target’s Off-Target Campaign Contribution, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK, 
Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_33/b4191032682244.htm. 
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discipline helps explain why fiduciary duties focus on clearly selfish 
conduct and leave other types of agent misbehavior to the light touch 
of the business judgment rule.56  
Notwithstanding general theory casting doubt on justifications for 
governance regulation of corporate speech, data might paint a 
different picture. Bebchuk and Jackson cite limited empirical work 
suggesting a misalignment of incentives, including a working paper 
by Professor John Coates.57 Coates presents evidence negatively 
correlating corporate political activity with shareholder democracy 
variables and with corporate value (measured by Tobin’s Q).58 There 
are questions about what the data shows. For example, the negative 
correlation with Tobin’s Q may be because firms hurt most by 
government regulation must engage in more political activity.  
Coates’s negative correlation with shareholder democracy raises 
the separate issue of variations in shareholders’ expressive 
preferences. Shareholders who have an expressive interest in 
corporate speech are most likely to be activists in general or to have 
significant stakes in particular firms. Rather than investing in 
diversified portfolios, these shareholders can choose to invest only in 
firms that empower them to influence corporate speech. Also, some 
shareholders may have idiosyncratic preferences at odds with the 
general run of shareholders who favor profit-maximization. These 
idiosyncratic investors can exclude from their portfolios firms whose 
objectives they disagree with. Many investors do engage in such 
“social” investing.59 Coates’s data may indicate not that corporate 
speech hurts or is disfavored by shareholders generally, but that the 
sorting suggested in this paragraph is actually occurring. 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209 (2005). 
 57. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, at 92 n.25. See John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth?, 
(Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper 684, 
Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Coates%20SSRN-id1680861.pdf. 
 58. Coates, supra note 57. An earlier study had also shown a negative correlation between corporate 
political activity and corporate returns. See generally Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political 
Donations: Investment or Agency? (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670. 
 59. See Ribstein, supra note 56, at 228. 
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All of this is not to say that corporate speech perfectly reflects 
shareholders’ expressive preferences. However, any divergence of 
corporate speech from shareholder preferences must be viewed as 
just one page in the much larger agency cost story. The design of 
agency cost controls is highly complex and disciplined by robust 
markets. These considerations suggest that even if regulation of 
corporate governance processes connected with corporate speech 
could marginally increase protection of expression by some 
shareholders, the regulation still might be unconstitutional because it 
excessively burdens speech. Moreover, as discussed in the next 
section, any divergence of interests among shareholders may raise 
more serious questions as to whose expression corporate governance 
regulation should protect. 
4.  Regulatory Interference with Free Expression 
Even if some corporate governance regulation serves to protect 
shareholders from funding or being associated with speech they 
disagree with, and even if the benefits of this regulation outweigh the 
costs in terms of restricting the total amount of corporate speech, the 
regulation still might not be justified under the First Amendment 
because it interferes with the expressive rights of some individual 
investors. 
First, regulation of governance processes related to corporate 
speech might favor the views of some shareholders over others, thus 
interfering with expressive rights as much as or more than do 
unregulated governance processes. Although some shareholders may 
object to the pro-business interests for-profit firms advocate, other 
shareholders may favor these views. Shareholder-maximizing firms 
may be the most efficient way for these shareholders to express and 
effectuate these pro-business views.60 Corporations are particularly 
important for expressing pro-business views because corporations’ 
                                                                                                                 
 60. It has been argued that corporate altruism may be the best way for shareholders to express and 
effectuate altruistic views. See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the 
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009). This supports rather than undermines the point 
made in the text by showing that shareholders have a variety of potential interests that can be 
represented through the corporations they invest in. 
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role in promoting for-profit speech faces less competition from 
philanthropic organizations than does corporations’ altruistic speech. 
To be sure, some non-profit organizations such as the American 
Enterprise Institute advocate for free markets. However, individual 
firms and the industry groups to which they contribute play an 
important role in advocating for specific business interests.61 It 
follows that regulating shareholder-maximizing firms’ speech may 
frustrate the self-expression of investors who favor the pro-business 
views that, in the absence of regulation, individual firms would 
engage in.  
Regulation of corporate governance theoretically could be 
designed to enable all shareholders to participate in determining what 
their corporations say, thereby helping to ensure that corporate 
speech best represents this combination of views. In practice, 
however, the pro-business shareholders may be most likely to be 
those with broadly diversified portfolios or who invest through 
intermediaries and, therefore, are least able to participate actively in 
governance processes aimed at shaping corporate speech. Even 
activists’ pro-business interests may differ from passive shareholders’ 
pro-business interests. For example, the activist shareholders may be 
undiversified and favor takeovers that affect costly wealth transfers 
between firms, while the passive shareholders own diversified 
portfolios and therefore favor only those takeovers that maximize the 
value of their entire portfolios.62 Regulation that protects hedge funds 
may not serve the expressive interests of diversified shareholders.63 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, present some data on the political activity of businesses and 
some pro-business groups. Although the presentation of this data is intended to highlight problematic 
corporate political activity, whether it is a problem depends shareholders’ expressive interests, as 
discussed in the text. 
 62. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive 
Device, 40 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 41–46 (2006). 
 63. A prominent Delaware jurist has characterized this as a conflict between long-term and short-
term ownership, which he refers to as the “separation of ‘ownership from ownership.’” See Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Oct. 5, 2009, 
available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/ (last visited Feb. 24, 
2011) (“[The financial] intermediaries who invest their capital . . . have powerful incentives . . . to push 
corporate boards to engage in risky activities that may be adverse to the interest of long-term investors 
and society. That is, there is now a separation of ‘ownership from ownership’ that creates conflicts of its 
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Thus, corporate activism, even if apparently designed to level the 
playing field, may actually slant it toward particular shareholders, 
and frustrate the others’ expressive rights.  
Apart from which shareholders regulation should favor, there is the 
additional question of why shareholders’ interests should weigh more 
heavily than those of other stakeholders. For example, preferred 
shareholders may have only minimal governance rights and creditor-
like interests in equity, while convertible debenture holders may have 
a significant shareholder-like interest in the residual left after paying 
other claimants. Moreover, the interests even of claimants with 
conventional rights may depend on particular circumstances. 
Derivative securities may enable shareholders to convey away their 
voting rights,64 while in firms approaching insolvency, creditors may 
resemble shareholders and the original shareholders may be left with 
only a highly contingent claim.65 Perhaps most importantly, it is not 
clear why shareholders’ expressive interests should take precedence 
over those of employees, who are likely to identify far more closely 
with their employer’s speech than do shareholders with broadly 
diversified portfolios, or over the executives who may have actually 
formulated the speech. 
Given this proliferation of interests among corporate stakeholders, 
procedures that enable all those who care about corporate speech to 
be heard could sharply constrain corporations’ ability to speak at all. 
This could frustrate the public’s right to hear corporate speech and 
thus fall outside Citizens United’s limited exception for corporate 
governance regulation. Procedures protecting individual 
shareholders’ expressive rights could create an “anti-commons” that 
would cripple the corporation’s power to speak by leaving no one in 
control of it.66 Moreover, government manipulation of corporate 
                                                                                                                 
own that are analogous to those of the paradigmatic, but increasingly outdated, Berle-Means model for 
separation of ownership from control.”). 
 64. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2005−06). 
 65. See Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, Directors’ Duties in Failing Firms, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 
529, 531 (2007). 
 66. See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (2008) (explaining how various 
types of legal rules can hobble the practical ability to exercise control over property). 
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governance processes to protect the expression of various corporate 
participants could lend itself to the government’s use of “censorship 
to control thought” the Court warned about.67 
The alternative to the potential chaos and restrictions on corporate 
speech that could result from trying to protect individual 
shareholders’ expressive rights is the strong board primacy inherent 
in the corporate form.68 The agency costs inherent in delegating 
control over corporate speech to managers can be constrained by the 
devices and market forces discussed in section 3. If regulation is 
necessary, it should apply to corporate decision-making generally.  
To be sure, the above discussion might underestimate the benefits 
of corporate speech regulation in protecting shareholders’ expression 
and overestimate the costs. However, the Court made clear in 
Citizens United that the risk inherent in government censorship is a 
paramount consideration. This suggests that proponents of corporate 
governance-type regulation of corporate speech bear the burden of 
proof in the cost-benefit analysis.  
5.  Free Expression and Distortion 
In the final analysis, it is not clear that corporate speech regulation 
advocated on corporate governance grounds is really about protecting 
the expression of shareholders or others connected with the corporate 
speakers. The dissenters noted that “the Austin Court did not hold 
[the shareholder protection rationale] out as an adequate and 
independent ground for sustaining the statute in question. Rather, the 
Court applied it to reinforce the anti-distortion rationale, in part by 
providing a reason “for doubting that these ‘expenditures reflect 
actual public support for the political ideas espoused.’”69 The 
dissenters’ real concern, in other words, is with what might be called 
the potential for “external” distortion by corporate speech rather than 
“internal” distortion of particular shareholders’ views. Regulating 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. 
 68. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1735, 1735 (2006).  
 69. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 
677 (1990)). 
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corporate speech through the procedures of corporate democracy is 
just a second-best way of accomplishing what the dissenters really 
want to do but cannot do after Citizens United—correcting distortion 
in public debate by banning certain corporate speech. 
The Court is unlikely to accept this end-run around its rejection of 
the distortion rationale. The external distortion rationale for 
regulating corporate speech is not only different from but also 
incompatible with the concern for protecting shareholders’ 
expression. The external distortion rationale is not based on a concern 
that corporations would be wasting shareholders’ money on corporate 
speech, but rather that they might use it too well to gain political 
influence. Thus, the Citizens United dissenters said that corporations  
are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not 
simply because they have a lot of money but because of their 
legal and organizational structure. Remove all restrictions on 
their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a type of rent 
seeking that is ‘far more destructive’ than what noncorporations 
are capable of.70   
Indeed, as discussed above in section 4, corporate governance laws 
are likely to hamper corporate operations by weakening the 
centralized management that is critical to this structure. Those who 
embrace the corporate governance approach as a second-best solution 
to the problem of corporate speech see this weakening as a feature 
rather than a bug. Yet this approach also undermines its own 
premises since it frustrates the objectives of many, if not most, of the 
shareholders it purports to serve. 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 975 (citing Robert Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2002)). The divergence between 
internal and external distortion, however, may not be as great as the proponents of corporate speech 
restrictions believe, because corporations’ interest in profits is likely to constrain their political activity. 
Investments in political activity rarely have positive net present value given for-profit firms’ opportunity 
costs for their capital and these investments also may impose rent-seeking costs on shareholders who 
hold widely diversified portfolios and do not gain from zero-sum inter-firm wealth transfers. See 
Ribstein, supra note 7, at 138. 
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In short, there is a tension between regulating corporate speech on 
the ground that it distorts the electorate’s view and regulating it in 
order to protect shareholders’ self-expression. Citizens United made 
clear that, at most, only the latter counts as a justification for 
regulating corporate speech under the First Amendment.  
C.  Proposed Governance Regulation 
Even assuming that corporate speech regulation may be justified to 
protect shareholder expression, there is a question of how far this 
regulation may go. Whatever the purported basis of this regulation, it 
is likely to have some effect on corporate speech. Even if the Court 
accepts the general corporate governance rationale for regulating 
corporate speech, it is likely to set limits on the extent to which 
governance-oriented regulation can restrict corporate speech. 
These issues are directly implicated by the proposed Shareholder 
Protection Act (SPA).71  This Act would, among other things, require 
extensive quarterly and annual disclosures of corporate speech 
expenditures and majority shareholder authorization of “specific” 
expenditures a year in advance and impose damages for unauthorized 
expenditures.72  
The SPA makes clear that its purpose goes beyond merely 
protecting shareholders. As the bill’s “purpose and summary” notes 
in its opening sentences, “The [Citizens United] ruling invalidated 
longstanding provisions in U.S. election laws and raised fresh 
concerns about corporate influence in our political process. To 
address those concerns, the Shareholder Protection Act gives 
shareholders of public companies the right to vote on the company’s 
annual budget for political expenditures.”73 In other words, 
the proposed Act is concerned with “corporate influence.”74 This 
illustrates the tension discussed above between the concern for 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See generally Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 72. Id. at 9–10. 
 73. H.R. Rep. No. 111-620, at 4 (2010). 
 74. Id. at 5. 
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shareholder expression and that for corporate distortion of the 
political process.75   
Apart from the uncertainty of the Act’s intended goal, its means of 
implementing this goal probably cannot survive First Amendment 
scrutiny under Citizens United.76 First, the Court suggested that, 
while a corporate governance regulation might pass, a remedy “based 
on speech, contravenes the First Amendment.”77 The SPA, like the 
restrictions at issue in Citizens United, is “based on speech.” This 
raises the question whether the proposed Act’s restrictions can be 
sustained on shareholder-protection grounds discussed above in this 
Part. 
Second, the SPA favors the expression of some stakeholders to the 
detriment of more passive shareholders. The provisions requiring 
authorization of expenditures may, depending on the applicable 
voting rules, empower activist shareholders, such as public pension 
funds, while submerging the preferences of many, perhaps a majority, 
of others.   
Third, the Act’s requirement that corporations get advance 
shareholder approval for corporate political activity sharply 
constrains all such speech by essentially requiring firms to lock in 
their political activity for a year from the close of a fiscal year. This 
prevents firms from dealing effectively with a dynamic political 
landscape. Managers’ treble damage “fiduciary” liability for 
unauthorized speech reinforces this inflexibility. Imposing these 
burdens on speech would be inconsistent with Citizens United’s 
emphasis on the social value of corporate speech.78  
Bebchuk and Jackson’s governance proposals79 may fare better 
under the First Amendment because they are more squarely aimed at 
corporate governance and the internal distortion problem. The 
authors suggest requiring the shareholders approve the firm’s overall 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See infra Part II.B.5. 
 76. Note that these comments apply to federal legislation like the Shareholder Protection Act and not 
to state corporate law. See infra Part III.E. 
 77. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 78. Id. at 978 n.76.  
 79. See generally Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, at 96–117. 
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spending budget, allowing shareholders to submit binding resolutions 
on corporate speech for shareholder vote, requiring that independent 
directors make decisions on corporate speech, and mandating more 
disclosure concerning corporate speech decisions.80 These provisions 
are probably less onerous than those in the SPA, depending on their 
specific implementation, including how they interact with the rules 
for shareholder voting under federal and state law.81 Bebchuk and 
Jackson also would enable shareholders to opt out of the regulation, 
which further mitigates the impact on corporate speech.82   
The main problem with the Bebchuk-Jackson proposal is that it 
allows for possible super-majority shareholder authorization of 
corporate speech in order to protect the expressive rights of minority 
shareholders. As discussed in subpart B, protecting the expressive 
rights of some shareholders may infringe the expression of other 
stakeholders and unacceptably restrict corporate speech under the 
Citizens United listeners’ rights rationale. These concerns increase 
with the level of protection for minority shareholders. Bebchuk and 
Jackson even suggest any level of shareholder approval is acceptable 
that enables “a practically meaningful opportunity to obtain the 
required approval.”83 The authors draw this standard from cases on 
whether state antitakeover law preempts federal law protecting 
shareholders’ rights.84 The preemption standard is based on the intent 
underlying federal takeover law and has little to do with determining 
corporations’ and corporate stakeholders’ rights regarding corporate 
speech.85 
In short, in determining the constitutionality of governance 
regulation, courts must weigh protection of shareholder expression 
against frustrating corporate speech generally and the expression 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 98–99. 
 81. As to the interaction between federal and state corporate law on corporate speech regulation, See 
infra Part III.E. 
 82. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, at 97, 102–03. 
 83. Id. at 116. 
 84. Id. at 96.   
 85. However, these preemption decisions are indirectly relevant in showing how governance 
regulation might combine with the First Amendment to help federalize state corporation law. See infra 
note 118 and accompanying text.  
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rights of particular shareholders and stakeholders. The proposed 
SPA’s burden on corporate speech is likely to be too great even 
without this balancing. 
III.  CORPORATE SPEECH BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 
The governance rationale for regulating corporate speech has 
several general implications for the application of the First 
Amendment to business association speech beyond the specific 
contexts that Citizens United deals with. Subparts A and B discuss 
types of firms other than the publicly held for-profit corporations, 
subparts C and D discuss speech other than campaign contributions, 
and subpart E discusses state law. These implications highlight 
additional difficulties with the governance rationale for regulating 
business association speech under the First Amendment.  
A.  Non-Profits 
Congress and the Court have struggled with the application of 
BCRA to non-profit corporations formed to promote political ideas. 
Because these firms are formed for expressive purposes, they may 
not seem to involve the external distortion problem. This conclusion, 
however, is questionable given the political power of some of these 
organizations and the fact that they do not operate under the 
constraints for-profits face in using their funds for business purposes. 
Moreover, the Court and Congress have found it difficult to design a 
for-profit exception that would appropriately distinguish 
organizations according to their distortion potential without giving 
for-profit corporations a big loophole from constraints on 
expenditures. In Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life, Inc.,86 the Court held unconstitutional expenditure 
limitations as applied to political-purpose non-profits. This case and 
the Snowe-Jeffords amendment to BCRA effectuating it87 would not 
have exempted Citizens United because it was funded partly by for-
                                                                                                                 
 86. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986). 
 87. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2) (2002). 
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profit corporations, and the Court in Citizens United declined to read 
into the Act an exception that would effectively allow for-profit 
corporations to use general treasury funds for independent 
expenditures by funneling them through non-profits.88  
Questions about how to deal with non-profits are not solved but 
rather intensified under the corporate governance approach to 
regulating corporate speech. The basic problem is the failure to 
recognize that the underlying agency cost problem applies to 
delegation of control in all types of associations. Indeed, agency costs 
arguably are even higher in non-profits than in for-profits. The 
contributors to charitable-type non-profits usually are not merely 
passive, like public corporations shareholders, but have no 
governance rights at all. This leaves the state as the only monitor.  
Contributors’ only option in opposing speech of an organization 
with which they disagree is to exit and stop contributing.89 But non-
profits can exploit their members’ moral commitment to the cause, 
geographical proximity, or social incentives to join, and can offer 
politicians not only money but member votes.90 Indeed, members or 
contributors might be more willing to tolerate use of funds gathered 
for ideological aims with which they disagree than owners of for-
profits, because the latter can choose from a wider range of firms 
expressing similar views. Contributors to non-profits are left with a 
choice between the greater clout of a large organization that 
imperfectly expresses their views and the lesser clout of a smaller 
organization with whose positions they completely agree. Thus, even 
if they have less total revenues than for-profits, non-profits may be 
able to use contributor loyalty to outbid for-profits for candidates’ 
political support. 
Allowing an exception for non-profits not only ignores the agency 
problems in these organizations but also could exacerbate them in 
for-profit corporations. Political action committees, in particular, 
interfere with shareholder expression by channeling corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891. 
 89. See generally Ribstein, supra note 7, at 137. 
 90. See id. at 138. 
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political activity further away from shareholder control and into 
organizations controlled solely by managers.91 Addressing this 
problem may require imposing a costly and intrusive disclosure 
regime or prohibiting all corporations and their agents not only from 
not making direct contributions but also from contributing through 
any other associations.  
Even if agency costs are lower and expressive fidelity is higher in 
non-profits than in for-profits, the question remains whether these 
differences justify sharply different treatment of for-profits under the 
First Amendment. The relevant question is whether the costs in terms 
of potential government censorship of speech and interference with 
expression by some stakeholders outweigh the benefits in vindicating 
other stakeholders’ expressive rights. As the Court said in Citizens 
United, “[T]he Government may commit a constitutional wrong 
when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”92 This may be 
the effect of restricting for-profit corporate speech but not the speech 
of non-profit associations.  
B.  Types of For-Profit Firms 
The Citizens United majority notes that BCRA applies not only to 
large corporations but also to closely held firms that not only do not 
raise the distortion problem highlighted by the dissent, but also are at 
a disadvantage because of large firms’ ability to use their substantial 
resources for lobbying.93 Thus, the majority was concerned that 
millions of small firms would be pointlessly disenfranchised and saw 
this as an argument against the external distortion rationale for 
regulating corporate speech.94 The distinctions among types of for-
profit firms from the standpoint of the governance rationale for 
regulating business association speech raise additional questions 
about regulating corporate speech. 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 141; Sullivan, supra note 17, at 172.  
 92. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. 
 93. Id. at 908. 
 94. Id.  
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/6
2011] FIRST AMENDMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
1047 
The ubiquity of agency costs raises questions about distinctions 
between types of for-profits as it does about distinctions between for-
profits and non-profits. The potential for distorted expression exists 
whenever there is a delegation of power that creates a separation of 
ownership and control. Small firms may not involve the same sort of 
internal distortion as in large firms because concentrated shareholders 
who can interact personally can express their views through the firm 
more effectively than can thousands of dispersed shareholders. 
However, small firms involve a different type of agency problem 
resulting from the delegation of power to a majority of shareholders 
and the consequent lock-out of minority shareholders. Thus, in the 
famous case of Dodge v. Ford, controlling shareholder Henry Ford 
sought to use the firm’s resources for the ostensible purpose of 
helping consumers over the objection of minority shareholders.95 A 
similar problem would arise if Ford were using the Dodges’ money 
for speech rather than lowering the price of its cars. 
Agency problems and therefore internal distortion are, if anything, 
more serious in closely held than in publicly held firms. In a publicly 
held firm with dispersed shareholders, the directors may be able to 
control day-to-day acts but still need shareholder approval of 
extraordinary acts, such as a transfer of control. When passive 
shareholders sell, their shares may end up with contestants for control 
who are in a position to challenge incumbent managers. By contrast, 
in a closely held firm, the majority’s plenary control over corporate 
acts may result in complete silencing of minority shareholders with 
substantial investments. More importantly, the owners of closely held 
corporations, which do not trade in public securities markets, may 
have no ability to object to corporate speech by exiting as do 
shareholders in publicly traded firms. 
Even if closely held firms could be said to involve less of a 
problem with shareholder expression than publicly held firms, it is 
not clear that this distinction justifies different treatment of publicly 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919). In fact, Ford may have been more 
interested in squeezing out the Dodge Brothers or at least preventing them from setting up a competing 
company. See Edward Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497, 519–
23 (1992). 
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and closely held firms under the First Amendment. Moreover, further 
distinctions among firms might be necessary to mesh the scope of 
speech regulation with its rationale and avoid over-inclusiveness or 
under-inclusiveness. For example, should corporations with a 
controlling interest be distinguished from management-controlled 
firms? If so, what level of control should be deemed sufficient to 
prevent adequate expression by minority shareholders?   
A specific question that arises in applying the First Amendment to 
closely held firms is how the law should approach unincorporated 
firms (i.e., uncorporations) under the shareholder protection rationale. 
These firms generally trade off corporate-type agency cost controls, 
such as fiduciary duties, shareholder voting, and the market for 
control for uncorporate devices, particularly including an enhanced 
power to cash out of the firm.96 Since owner exit is effective even 
without coordination with other owners, this device arguably results 
in less distortion of owner interests in both publicly and closely held 
uncorporations. On the other hand, if internal distortion depends 
solely on owners’ self-expression, enhanced exit might not avoid 
distortion even if it minimizes overall agency costs.  
First Amendment-based distinctions among types of firms thus 
open the corporate governance rationale to a Pandora’s Box of 
complications. The amount and types of agency costs, and therefore 
internal distortion and the need for regulation, depend on firms’ 
contractual arrangements, organizational form, and size. In addition 
to the distinctions already discussed, there are other factors affecting 
shareholder control, including the use of financial derivatives to 
separate control from economic ownership,97 and the use of 
securitization to separate firms’ assets from their operations through 
special purpose vehicles. These structures raise the question of how 
much and what type of control capital contributors must have over 
resources used for political activity in order to justify regulation on 
shareholder protection grounds.  
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Ribstein, supra note 53, at Chapter 2. 
 97. See Hu & Black, supra note 64.  
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C.  Non-Political Speech  
Citizens United dealt with certain publicly distributed 
communications referring to identified candidates for federal office. 
This raises the question of how the First Amendment, and 
specifically the corporate governance rationale for regulation, would 
apply to other types of corporate speech.    
This question invokes the distinction between “commercial” and 
other types of speech. The Court has held that speech proposing a 
commercial transaction is entitled to a lower level of First 
Amendment protection than other types of speech.98 One reason for 
the distinction is that corporations have more robust incentives to 
engage in commercial speech and, therefore, are less likely to be 
deterred by regulation from engaging in socially valuable speech.99 
Thus, applying the same level of regulation to both types of speech 
could unbalance public debate by over-weighting commercial 
discourse. Corporate speech on a public issue, such as an 
advertisement advocating legislation to reduce global warming, 
arguably does not fit this definition of “commercial speech” and 
therefore, would seem to be entitled to the highest level of protection.  
On the other hand, corporations inherently blur the distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial speech since they often 
may use social responsibility to sell their products100 and have an 
extra incentive to do so if this helps them avoid regulation.101 The 
most adamant opponents of corporate speech likely would agree 
concerning the artificiality of distinguishing commercial and non-
commercial corporate speech, since they claim that corporations are 
monomaniacal profit-maximizers regardless of the language they use 
in their advertising.102 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980). 
 99. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First 
Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163 (1994–95) (discussing the rationale of the commercial speech 
doctrine). 
 100. See generally Ribstein, supra note 54.  
 101. See Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 161, 195 (2010) (discussing this tactic as a form of “alchemy”).  
 102. See Greenfield, supra note 39. 
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Applying the shareholder protection rationale for regulating 
corporate speech further complicates the distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial speech. Investors who seek 
maximum returns would favor profit-maximizing commercial speech. 
This suggests that commercial speech poses less risk of internal 
distortion than non-commercial speech. Conversely, these 
shareholders may object to corporations’ non-political expressions of 
support for good causes.103   
After Citizens United, the debate over distinguishing commercial 
and non-commercial speech might be settled in favor of the 
majority’s listeners’ rights rationale, particularly given the above 
complications of applying the opinion’s other rationales. Since both 
types of advertisements express ideas that are important in a 
commercial economy—support for a particular product and 
opposition to a general type of product (e.g., one that threatens global 
warming)—both would seem equally entitled to First Amendment 
protection.104  
D.  Corporate Governance Speech 
The analysis so far in this paper suggests that the First Amendment 
would not permit regulating corporate speech on the theory that this 
regulation is necessary to protect shareholders’ right of self 
expression. This has direct application to regulating corporations’ 
internal governance speech, such as communications to shareholders 
regarding corporate elections.  
An important pre-Citizens United case on corporate governance 
speech is Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission 
(PGE),105 where the Court struck down under the First Amendment a 
law compelling speech by a corporation in the form of mandatory 
inserts in its power bills. Justice Stevens, the Citizens United 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, n.97 (“[L]ike political speech, there may be reason to 
believe that special rules are needed to ensure that decisions regarding corporate charitable contributions 
are in shareholders’ interests.”); Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1191 (2002).  
 104. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 99. 
 105. 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
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dissenter, also dissented in PGE, comparing the regulation at issue to 
the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule, which requires corporations to 
distribute statements to its shareholders in connection with corporate 
elections.106 The majority rejected the analogy because the 
shareholder proposal rule does “not limit the range of information 
that the corporation may contribute to the public debate” and because 
proxy regulation governs managers’ use of corporate property. 107   
The PGE distinction makes some sense in terms of the shareholder 
protection rationale. Under that reasoning, it is arguably acceptable to 
regulate speech within the corporation in order to protect 
shareholders’ control of corporate resources. This would seem to be 
an even more important consideration post-Citizens United, given 
corporations’ new freedom to spend their resources on political 
speech. On the other hand, PGE’s fine distinction between proxy and 
other types of corporate speech would not square with Citizens 
United’s broad listener-based rationale. Thus, corporate governance, 
and specifically proxy regulation, may be a significant battleground 
for Citizens United’s shareholder protection rationale for regulating 
corporate speech. 
This reasoning is particularly relevant to the SEC’s new Rule 14a-
11 providing that large, long-term shareholders (i.e., those who have 
held a three percent interest for three years) may use the 
corporation’s proxy materials to nominate directors.108 It has been 
argued that the PGE distinction between billing inserts and 
shareholder proposals would not apply to this rule because it affects 
the speech of shareholders such as hedge funds and not just corporate 
officials.109 However, the speech would still relate to internal 
corporate governance rather than to the corporation’s external speech, 
and therefore arguably would fall within one of PGE’s rationales.  
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 39–40. 
 107. Id. at 14 n.10. 
 108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2010). 
 109. See Opening Brief of Petitioners Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America at 58–59, Bus. Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 
No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 2010), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2010/12/Gibson-
Dunn_Brief_proxy-access-rule-challenge.pdf.  
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The shareholder protection argument seems to support PGE’s 
internal-external speech distinction. In order to ensure that corporate 
speech reflects shareholders’ views—that is, to protect against 
internal distortion—the First Amendment arguably permits not only 
direct regulation of authorization of corporate speech, such as via the 
proposed Shareholder Protection Act, but regulation of corporate 
governance processes that might affect control over corporate speech, 
such as Rule 14a-11.  
On the other hand, the analysis comes out differently under 
Citizens United’s listeners’ right rationale. As corporate activities are 
more regulated and therefore seek to play an increasing role in public 
discourse, their internal governance debates increasingly relate to 
political debates occurring outside the corporation.110 This suggests a 
direct conflict between the shareholder protection rationale, which 
seeks to regulate internal governance because of its effect on public 
debate, and the special need for First Amendment protection of 
speech related to that debate.  
A further quandary in applying the shareholder protection rationale 
of regulating corporate speech concerns the question of which 
shareholders. This is raised directly by Rule 14a-11, which, as noted 
above, favors certain large long-term shareholders. Larger 
shareholders may favor rent-seeking actions that seek to transfer 
wealth among the firms in their broadly diversified portfolios. On the 
other hand, smaller, diversified shareholders, who own substantial 
amounts of large corporations’ shares, would favor actions that 
benefit their whole portfolios and not costly wealth transfers between 
individual firms in those portfolios.  
Citizens United’s listeners’ rights rationale raises additional 
questions concerning the constitutionality of other securities law 
provisions constraining truthful speech, particularly including 
prohibition of speech in unregistered public offerings under the 
                                                                                                                 
 110. One commentator seems to suggest that this connection with public debate actually favors 
regulation. See Siebecker, supra note 101, at 164–65 (arguing for a “discourse” theory of proxy 
regulation on the ground that “the ability to direct corporate decisions represents the ability to control 
political life”). Whether or not this theory makes sense as a normative matter, its relationship with public 
debate would heighten the First Amendment concern.  
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Securities Act of 1933111 and Regulation FD, which penalizes 
selective disclosure of material information to securities analysts.112 
These examples suggest that securities regulation may come under 
broad constitutional scrutiny following Citizens United.113 
E.  State vs. Federal Law 
The constitutional proscription arguably applies only to federal 
mandatory law. Firms’ ability to shop for corporate governance law 
under the “internal affairs” choice of law rule takes the teeth out of 
any speech regulation in state law and thus insulates these laws from 
a First Amendment challenge. This is analogous to Bebchuk and 
Jackson’s defense of shareholder opt-out rules for federal 
regulation.114 By contrast, state election law that applies to 
corporations doing business in the state (as opposed to those 
incorporated in the state) should be treated the same as federal law 
for First Amendment purposes, since it may be as hard for firms with 
shareholders in every state to avoid being subject to these statutes as 
it is for them to avoid federal law.  
Additional questions concern the interaction between state and 
federal governance law. Federal statutes like the Shareholder 
Protection Act and the Bebchuk-Jackson proposals call for 
authorization of corporate speech through governance procedures that 
are basically established by state law. Thus, a federal statute that 
requires a shareholder vote but is otherwise silent may implicate state 
procedures for determining such issues as who may vote, how the 
votes are counted, and when and how meetings are called. Provisions 
for director votes on corporate speech depend on state procedures for 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 99. Regulation of this speech is being tested in Bulldog 
Investors Gen. & Others v. Sec’y. of Commonwealth, SJC-10756, which is challenging a Massachusetts 
law forbidding general advertising of unregistered offerings of hedge fund shares. See Larry E. Ribstein, 
The First Amendment, the Securities Laws and Hedge Funds, TRUTH ON THE MARKET, Jan. 3, 2011, 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/01/03/the-first-amendment-the-securities-laws-and-hedge-funds/. 
 112. See Larry Ribstein, SEC “Fair Disclosure” Rule is Constitutionally Suspect, 10 WASH. LEGAL 
FOUND. LEGAL OPINION LETTER 17 (Oct. 6, 2000). 
 113. For a general analysis of the application of the First Amendment to securities regulation, See 
Butler and Ribstein, supra note 99. 
 114. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 36, at 103–04. 
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electing directors. It follows that the constitutionality of these statutes 
may depend on their associated state procedures. Moreover, 
provisions protecting minority shareholders raise questions 
concerning the level of minority control under state law at which 
these provisions are unnecessary to protect shareholder expression 
and, therefore, unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  
This analysis suggests that federal laws enacted under the 
shareholder protection rationale could have the indirect effect of 
broadly subjecting state corporate law to First Amendment 
scrutiny.115 This is another reason to be concerned about such laws.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The debate over the constitutionality of corporate speech 
regulation took a significant turn in Citizens United but did not end 
with that case. The Court’s liberation of corporate political speech 
touched off a furor that the bare majority decision is unlikely to quell. 
Moreover, although the majority’s broad listener-based rights 
approach attempts to settle corporations’ First Amendment rights, it 
leaves room for regulation that does not attempt to directly limit 
corporate speech.  
Some of the post-Citizens United debate focuses on the central 
dispute between the majority and dissenting opinions regarding the 
impact of corporate speech on public debate. The majority opinion 
reasoned that the corporate identity of the speaker should not 
diminish the application of the First Amendment. This addresses 
arguments that speech emanating from artificial entities is not entitled 
to First Amendment protection.  
Although the majority opinion clarified that corporate speech is 
fully protected under the First Amendment, it opened another issue 
concerning the constitutionality of regulating the corporate decision-
making processes that authorize this speech. This approach seems to 
                                                                                                                 
 115. This is analogous to the question of when state corporate law should be preempted because it 
unduly impedes the functioning of federal takeover law. See Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption as 
Micromanagement, 65 BUS. LAW. 789 (2010). 
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have advantages over the distortion argument, including its 
recognition that “corporate” speech is really the speech of the 
individuals who contract through the corporation rather than that of 
an artificial entity.    
Despite the superficial attraction of the corporate governance 
move, this paper shows that approaching corporate speech through its 
governance processes fails to provide a coherent basis for regulation 
under the First Amendment. It is far from clear that regulation is 
justified to protect shareholders’ expressive interests. Moreover, 
regulation that protects some shareholders could harm the expressive 
interests of other corporate stakeholders.  
In the final analysis, the majority’s listeners’ rights theory may be 
the only viable approach for dealing with political and commercial 
corporate speech. Now that it is clear that protection of corporate 
speech under the First Amendment cannot be diminished by shunting 
the speech off into an artificial entity, any justification for regulation 
would have to grapple with the complexities of corporate finance and 
governance and with the myriad variations among business and non-
business associations. Add the risks inherent in politicians deciding 
who can speak and the better course is to err on the side of free 
speech.  
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